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Abstract
In a context of bilateral bargaining between an upstream supplier
and several downstream buyers, this note determines the conditions
under which two buyers have an incentive to merge depending on
whether (i) the bargaining process is simultaneous or sequential and
(ii) the post merger buyer becomes pivotal or not. We also determine
conditions under which the players will prefer to bargain simultane-
ously or in sequence.
JEL Classification: L22, C78
Keywords: bargaining, Shapley value, pivotal player, buyer merger
∗Department of Economics and Management, NFH, University of Tromsø, N-9037
Tromsø, Norway. E-mail: derek.clark@nfh.uit.no
†Université Paris X Nanterre, EconomiX, Bat G, 200 av de la République, 92001 Nan-
terre Cedex, France. E-mail:olivier.musy@u-paris10.fr
‡Université Paris Est, OEP-TEPP (FRn◦3126, CNRS) Cité Descartes, 5 bd Descartes,
77454 Champs sur Marne Cedex 2, France. E-mail: pereau@univ-mlv.fr
1
1 Introduction
When a seller engages in bilateral bargaining with multiple buyers over the
payment corresponding to the quantity purchased, one can imagine bargain-
ing structures that are simultaneous as well as those in which negotiations
will be conducted in sequence. In the theoretical literature both types of
procedure have been investigated: Chipty and Snyder (1999) and Raskovich
(2003) are examples of simultaneous bargaining in this context, whereas Stole
and Zwiebel (1996) conduct their analysis in a sequential framework. Indeed,
Raskovich (2003) presents a numerical example in his model such that the
seller involved is always better off with simultaneous bargaining. In this
note we present more general conditions under which this result will and
will not hold. Part of the focus of the inaugural work of Chipty and Snyder
(1999) is on buyer merger with simultaneous bargaining over supply con-
tracts; they divide the incentives into the standard effect that the merger
may have on upstream and downstream efficiency, and a new channel re-
flecting the bargaining position of the merging buyers vis-a-vis the supplier.
Raskovich (2003) refines these results by introducing the notion that some
buyers may be pivotal in the sense that effective production relies on agree-
ment with them. A merged firm that become pivotal always tends to have
its bargaining power reduced since it has to pay a higher price for its supply.1
We retain the possibility of merged buyers in our analysis, and analyse how
bargaining power is affected by the type of negotiation that is conducted.
In contrast to the simultaneous bargaining conducted in the analyses of
Chipty and Snyder (1999) and Raskovich (2003), Stole and Zwiebel (1996)
examine a sequential bilateral bargaining process between a single firm and
employees in the context of non-binding labour contracts. Non-binding con-
tracts are terminable at will and after the failure of one round of bargaining
or the termination of an employee, all the other workers can engage in renego-
tiation. They show that the non cooperative equilibrium outcome in which
there is no incentive for agents to re-open negotiation is equivalent to the
Shapley values of a corresponding cooperative game without introducing any
form of randomization over the player order and expectations of payoffs over
all ordering. They underscore that this result holds for any bargaining or-
der, and this is a result that we utilise in our analysis. Chipty and Snyder
(1999) relax the assumption of unenforceable contracts, so that the parties
that reach an agreement in the bargaining phase are bound by their contract.
1Adilov and Alexander (2006) show that this results does not necessarily hold when
the initial bargaining positions are not symmetric.
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Building on the work of Stole and Zwiebel (1996), Chipty and Snyder
(1999) and Raskovich (2003) both assume that bilateral negotiations are si-
multaneous and are over the marginal contribution of each buyer to the sup-
plier’s gross surplus. In every negotiation each buyer believes the supplier
will reach efficient agreements with all other buyers and so considers itself
as the marginal buyer. Each negotiated deal is "on the margin". Hence,
when the contribution of a buyer to the supplier’s surplus is greater (lower)
than the inframarginal buyer’s contribution, it has no incentive to merge
(to remain unintegrated) and prefers to bargain over its marginal (average)
contribution. According to Raskovich (2003), two points justify the simulta-
neous bilateral bargaining with respect to sequential bargaining.2 The first
is the numerical illustration mentioned above in which the supplier has fixed
cost and where the supplier is always better off in simultaneous negotiation.
Additionally, each buyer does not want to be the last to bargain since in that
case they will have to cover the fixed cost. This result is not derived from
a general specification of the supplier’s gross surplus function, however, and
we investigate its generality here. The second reason concerns the fact that
in sequential bargaining contracts are binding and irrevocable. If we assume
that every buyer has the same probability of participating in the final round
of negotiations, the sequential configuration considered briefly by Raskovich
(2003) corresponds to the Shapley value framework.3
The novelty of the work by Chipty and Snyder (1999) and Raskovich
(2003) is their attention to the effect that buyer merger may have on the
bargaining power of those involved. In spite of the reservations made in the
latter paper, we consider simultaneous and sequential bargaining frameworks
and show how these affect firm payoffs and the incentives of buyers to merge
in the downstreammarket. This is useful information to the upstream seller if
it is the case that it can decide which type of bargaining to enforce. Antitrust
and regulatory agencies would also be interested in these effects. We show
that whether firms prefer the sequential or simultaneous bargaining setup
depends crucially on the shape of the seller’s gross surplus function.
Section 2 presents the basic model. Sections 3 and 4 present the simulta-
neous and the sequential negotiation processes and solve for the equilibrium
payoffs and the merger conditions in each case. Brief conclusions are offered
in section 5.
2Let us remark that this section page 411-412 has been added to the 2001 working
paper (available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=288274).
3Hence we use the term sequential bargaining or Shapley value interchangeably.
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2 The Model
Based on Chipty and Snyder (1999) and Raskovich (2003), we consider one
supplier producing a homogeneous good demanded by n buyers i = 1, ..., n.
Let vi(qi) be the gross surplus obtained by buyer i when it purchases qi units
of the good, V (Q) the gross surplus obtained by the supplier from production
with Q =
Pn
i=1 qi the total supply of the good. The sequence of events is
the following: At stage one, the supplier enters negotiations with each of
the buyers separately. Negotiations are over the payment Ti paid by the
buyer to the supplier for the traded quantity qi. At stage two, the supplier
undertakes production and enforces the contracts when costs are covered:
V (Q) +
Pn
i=1 Ti ≥ 0, and does not produce if this inequality fails, in which
case all payoffs are zero. The net surpluses of buyer i and the seller are
NSBi = vi(qi)− Ti for i = 1, .., n (1)




Following the previous papers, an s-equilibrium refers to the pre-merger equi-
librium, in which the supplier bargains bilaterally with n separate buyers.
The m-equilibrium refers to the post-merger equilibrium in which the sup-
plier faces n− 1 buyers, the merged buyer denoted by 12 and the remaining
buyers. When buyers are separate entities during the negotiations, the vector
of equilibrium quantities purchased by the buyers is denoted by qs = (qs1, ...q
s
n)
















, i = 1, .., n
However when two buyers, namely 1 and 2 are merged the vector of quantities























, i = 3, .., n
Let us note that qmi 6= qsi for i = 3, ..n if qs1 + qs2 6= qs12. As in Raskovich
(2003), given the transfer paid by the buyers except i, T−i =
P
j 6=i Tj and
the quantity they purchaseQ−i, a buyer is pivotal to the supplier’s production
decision if and only if
V (Q−i) + T−i < 0 (3)
max
x
(V (Q−i + x) + vi(x)) + T−i > 0
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The first condition states that production is not possible if buyer i is not
involved. The second condition states that there are joint gains to reaching
an agreement. To simplify the notation, we set vi(qi) = vi.4
3 Simultaneous bilateral negotiation
The bargaining is over the transfer that the buyer i has to pay to the seller
for the purchase of a given amount qi corresponding to the incremental sur-
plus generated by their trade. We have to consider two kinds of bargaining
depending on whether it concerns a non pivotal or a pivotal buyer. In con-
trast to the previous work, we assume an infinite alternating offers framework
for the bargaining protocol. With common discount factor 1 ≥ δ > 0, the
discounted utility functions for a non pivotal buyer and a seller takes the
form
UsimBi (Ti, τ) = δ
τ (vi − Ti) (4)
U simS (Ti, τ) = δ
τ (∆Vi + Ti) (5)
for an agreement reached at time τ . S only considers the incremental gross
surplus ∆Vi = V (Q) − V (Q−i) without taking into account the transfers
paid by the other buyers. However when the seller faces a pivotal buyer, its
discounted utility function is
UsimS (Ti + T−i, τ) = δ
τ (V (Q) + Ti + T−i) (6)
Let us explain the simultaneous bargaining process between one seller and
3 buyers where buyer 1 is a pivotal. In its negotiation with B1, S bargains
over T1 but he only considers the gross surplus V (Q) since by definition
V (Q−1) + T−1 < 0 and takes into account the payments T2 and T3. In
its negotiation with B2, the bargain is over T2 and S only considers the
incremental gross surplus ∆V2 without taking into account T1 and T3. When
negotiating with B3 over T3, S only considers the incremental gross surplus
∆V3 without taking into account T1 and T2. In a non-pivotal bargaining, the













4We use the assumption vi(qi) as in Chipty and Snyder, whereas Raskovich allows for
the form vi(qi, q−i).
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where the superscript to the transfer denotes the identity of the player making
the offer. Assuming that S makes the first offer in all rounds of bargaining




More generally, we obtain the equilibrium payment and payoff























(vi + V (Q) + T−i) (10)
From (8) a non pivotal buyer gets a share of the increment to downstream
surplus vi and upstream surplus ∆Vi generated by its trading with the sup-
plier. For a pivotal buyer, its payoff (10) depends on all the payments T−i
made by the other non pivotal buyers given by (7). Under the pivotal con-
dition (3), the net surplus of a non pivotal buyer given by (8) exceeds the
surplus of a pivotal buyer (10) since the payment paid by a non pivotal (7) is
lower than the payment paid by a pivotal (9). It also implies that the seller
is always better off when facing n buyers including one pivotal buyer rather
than n non pivotal buyers. When the seller faces n non pivotal buyers, its
payoff is





and when it faces one pivotal buyer and (n− 1) non pivotal buyers
NSsimS(p) = V (Q




S(np) ⇔ Ti(p) > Ti(np)
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⇔ DE + UE +BP > 0 (13)
with
DE = vm12 − vs1 − vs2 (14)


















Following Chipty and Snyder (1999), the downstream efficiency (DE) term
measures the effect of the merger on the merging buyer’s gross surplus. DE >
0 when the merger leads to a fixed-cost saving or a reduction in marginal
costs. The upstream efficiency (UE) term measures the indirect effect of
the merger on the supplier’s gross surplus. The last term BP for bargaining
power captures the effect of the merger on the merging buyer’s bargaining
position vis-à-vis the supplier. The sign of this term depends on the shape
of the function V (), i.e. BP > (<)0 when V (Q) concave (convex).5 If the
supplier’s gross surplus function is concave, incremental surplus is low at the
margin, so buyers tend to gain by merging and bargaining jointly, thereby
making their purchases more inframarginal. Conversely, if the supplier’s
gross surplus is convex, incremental surplus is high at the margin, so a buyer
merger tends to worsen the merging buyers’ bargaining position.

































with Tm−12 given by (7). This corresponds to the result shown by Raskovich
(2003; equation 12.3).
4 Sequential bilateral bargaining
As discussed in the introduction, the results of Stole and Zwiebel (1996) lead
us to conclude that the outcome of sequential bargaining over the incremental
5See Chipty and Snyder (1999) Proposition 2.
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surplus added by each buyer in all possible orders is given by the Shapley














[V (S)− V (S − {i})]









The net surplus of the seller is given by





To determine the conditions under which a non pivotal buyer prefers to be
involved in simultaneous rather than in sequential bargaining, we have to
compare NSseqBi with NS
sim
Bi





= Γsi −∆V si




(Γsi −∆V si )
We obtain the following proposition
Proposition 1 A non-pivotal buyer prefers to be involved in sequential rather
than in simultaneous bargaining when the gross surplus function of the sup-
plier V (.) is concave. The seller is better off with simultaneous bargaining
when V (.) is concave. The opposite result holds if V (.) is convex.
Proof. It is easy to show that
• V (.) concave implies Γsi > ∆V si
• V (.) convex implies Γsi < ∆V si
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When V (.) is concave, a non pivotal buyer will make a lower payment
which increases its payoff but decreases the seller’s payoff.







⇔ DE + Γm12 − (Γs1 + Γs2) > 0 (22)
Let us remark that Proposition 1 remains valid for the seller when a
merger occurs but does not create a pivotal buyer. The seller prefers to
be involved in simultaneous rather than in sequential bargaining when V (.)
is concave. From (11) and (21), the condition NSsimS(np) > NS
seq
S(np) implies








i ) > 0 which is verified for V (.) con-
cave.
The comparison of the merger incentives in both bargaining configura-
tions gives the following proposition.
Proposition 2 With non-pivotal buyers, the merger condition in the sequen-
tial bargaining structure is more restrictive than in the simultaneous one when















Proof. From (22) and (13), we obtain











Note that all the terms in brackets of (23) are positive when V (.) is
concave and negative when V (.) is convex. This explains why the condition
in Proposition 2 is expressed in terms of absolute value.
Now we assume that after merging the new buyer denoted by B12 becomes






































with Tm−12 given by (19) where the number of buyers n is adjusted in the
expression for the shapley value. Since the last term in brackets is negative,
becoming pivotal after the merger reduces the incentive to merge. The com-
parison of the merger incentives in both bargaining cases gives the following
proposition.
Proposition 3 When the merged buyers become pivotal in the post-merger
situation, the merger condition in the sequential case will be more (less) re-
strictive when V (.) is concave (convex).



































This inequality holds always for V (.) concave since all the terms in brack-
ets are positive. Becoming pivotal after a buyer merger decreases the partici-
pants’ payoff since it has to make a higher payment; this is exacerbated when
V (.) is concave because the other buyers pay less in the sequential bargain.
5 Conclusion
The note has determined the conditions under which an upstream supplier
prefers to engage in simultaneous or sequential bargaining with several down-
stream buyers. The results depend crucially on the comparison between the
average of the inframarginal contributions and the average contribution. We
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